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The Myth and History of Woodrow Wilson’s 
Fourteen Points in Hungary
Tibor Glant
World War I ended 92 years ago, bút no genuine attempt has been 
made to relate the full story of Wilson’s Fourteen Points and its influence 
on Hungárián revisionism and on the Hungárián psyche. The Fourteen 
Points (and, especially Point Ten) were nőt simply a statement of 
American war aims as President Wilson saw them in January 1918. 
Technically speaking, Wilson’s address to Congress is one out of many 
public declarations of war aims by the belligerents in the war; yet it has 
attained mythical status, and notjust in Hungary. Because of what Wilson 
came to represent by the end of the war, the Fourteen Points became a 
Symbol of a better future, a world without future wars and based upon 
intemational cooperation, including somé form of collective security. Fór 
Hungarians after the Treaty of Trianon it became an undefined set of 
“Wilsonian principles” (most notably national self-determination) that 
should have served as the basis fór peace. Since this was nőt the case, 
Hungarians expected treaty revision to take piacé on the basis of these 
very principles. Interpretations of Wilson’s conduct ranged from tragic 
mistake to willful destruction of Hungary. Communist Hungary after 
1956 alsó considered it something important: it was one of the four 
American historical items included in the high school curriculum.
This article aims to (1) explain how the Fourteen Points fit intő the 
complex system of Allied war aims towards Austria-Hungary and (2) 
analyze why the myth of the Fourteen Points came about and how it has
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served (or was prevented from serving) realistic as well as unfounded 
revisionist expectations in Hungary, fór almost a century.
Allied War Aims
At the beginning of the war, Russia was the only major Allied 
power to declare her intention to dismember the empire of the Habsburgs: 
this was included in Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov’s 13 points 
in September 1914. Anglo-French war aims against Vienna were based 
upon Realpolitik. they depended on the constantly changing military 
situation and domestic developments. And although proponents of the 
dismemberment of Austria-Hungary were prominently represented 
among the key decision makers in both countries, the issue was first 
raised in public diplomacy only in early 1917. Meanwhile, the lesser 
Allies, Italy and Rumania, were promised territories form Austria and 
Hungary in their respective treaties signed in London (1915) and 
Bucharest (1916), and promptlyjoined the war thereafter.1
In December 1916 the newly reelected US president called upon all 
belligerents to publicly declare their war aims. The Allied reply (January 
10, 1917) was worded by Paris, and it promised support fór separatist 
movements inside Austria-Hungary. The Central Powers refused to 
reveal their war aims until a peace conference was called.2 A dejected 
Wilson called fór peace without victory (January 22), bút the Germans 
went back on earlier pledges and declared unrestricted submarine warfare 
on January 31. In response, the United States entered the war, bút 
declared herself an Associated Power to indicate that she did nőt share all 
Allied war aims. In his speech delivered to the joint session of Congress 
on April 2, Wilson claimed that the US would fight the war to make the 
world safe fór democracy and to prevent future wars. Four days later, the 
Senate granted the declaration of war on Germany. The US went on to 
declare war on Austria-Hungary, too, in December 1917. Wilson’s 
decision to enter the war as an Associated Power gave him more leeway 
in bilateral negotiations with the Central Powers, bút it alsó limited his 
room to move in military terms by creating what Theodore Roosevelt
1 Fór a summary of war aims see: Dávid Stevenson, The First World War and 
International Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), esp. Chapter 3. Hereafter: 
Stevenson, First World War.
2 Stevenson, First World War, 135-38.
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called “A Fifty-Fifty War Attitűdé:” Washington would have to be rather 
selective in where she sent her troops because they might engage the 
troops of countries the United States did nőt declare war upon.
During the course of 1917 Russia changed her form of government 
twice and exited the war following the Bolshevik Revolution in St. 
Petersburg. During the war, Francé had four changes of government; 
three took piacé in 1917. In December 1916, Henry Asquith was replaced 
by Dávid Lloyd George as British premier. In other words: of the four 
Allied and Associated Powers that would, one way or another, decide the 
future of Hungary, only the US had the same head of State at the outbreak 
and the conclusion of the conflict; the winter of 1916-17 proved to be a 
major turning point fór each one of them. Changes in domestic politics 
combined with the ever changing military situation to continuously re- 
shape Allied war aims during the war.
With somé considerable simplification we might say that the history 
of the European war breaks down intő three major periods. Until the 
winter of 1916 the frontlines moved rather dramatically. By the tűm of 
1916-17, the lines froze and this balance was upset only in laté 1917 by 
the Italian defeat at Caporetto and Russia’s exit from the war. Paris had 
legitimate fears that, following a separate German-Russian peace (which 
did come about in Brest-Litovsk on March 3, 1918), Germán troops 
would be moved to the western front and thus Berlin may get the upper 
hand. This imminent threat helped bring Clemenceau (nicknamed “The 
Tiger”) to power and he brought along a major revision of French war 
aims towards Vienna and Central Europe. (The third period lasted from 
February to November 1918. In the final, and quite hectic, year of the 
war, a major Germán offensive in July almost broke through in the 
western front, bút by the fali the Central Powers surrendered one by one, 
and the war ended on November 11 with the Germán surrender.)
During the critical winter of 1917-18, the Allies logically believed 
that the only feasible way of preventing Germán troops on the Russian 
front from being moved to the French front would be to engage them 
otherwise. The obvious solution was to remove Austria-Hungary form 
the war and force the Germans to choose between trying to score a quick 
victory in the west or securing contacts with Germán forces in Rumania 
(the Mackensen Army) and key allies in the Balkans (Bulgária and *
Theodore Roosevelt, Roosevelt in the Kansas City Star. War-Time Editorials by 
Theodore Roosevelt (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1921), 54-56.
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Turkey). There were two options: Austria could be negotiated out of the 
war via a separate peace treaty granting the empire of the Habsburgs 
territorial integrity. Or, she could be forced out of the war by inciting 
ethnic unrest among the prominent minorities that had had enough of 
Austrian and Hungárián rule. Either way, the Allies believed, Germany 
would be forced to occupy Austria and this would delay a major Germán 
offensive on the French front until US troops arrived in numbers. The 
Quay D’Orsay and the British Foreign Office launched a series of secret 
talks with official and unofficial Austrian and Hungárián representatives, 
mostly in the spy Capital of the war, Bern, Switzerland. In public, they 
supported the would-be successor States to apply more pressure on the 
Ballhausplatz and the new Emperor Charles, who had replaced Francis 
Joseph in January 1917.4 Since the US joined the war in April 1917, it is 
in this context that we must look at Wilson’s diplomatic moves and 
performance.
American War Aims and Diplomacy5
Until April 1917 Wilson saw himself as a bringer of peace: he 
offered to mediate in the fali of 1914 and sent Colonel Edward M. House 
on multiple diplomatic missions to Europe to feel out both sides in the 
conflict. Bút, in February 1917, he felt he had run out of options, and 
asked Congress fór a declaration of war on Germany. In his words, this 
was to be the final showdown between good and évii, or, as he pút it, “the 
war to end all wars.” Of course, in 1917 the US was in no position to send 
a major army to Europe that would significantly contribute to the Allied 
cause. In fact, in the Congressional debate the main argument was that the 
economic power of the new world giant alone would settle conflict. 
Wilson’s chief goals from day 1 were: (1) to win the war with minimum 
American loss of life and (2) to bring about a League of Nations that
4
Fór details of the secret negotiations see: Ferenc Fejtő, Requiem egy hajdanvolt 
birodalomért. Ausztria-Magyarország szétrombolása (Requiem fór a defunct empire: 
the break-up of Austria-Hungary) (Budapest: Atlantisz, 1990).
5 The following summary of American diplomacy and war aims is based on my own:
Through the Prism o f  the Habsburg Monarchy: Hungary in American Diplomacy and 
Public Opinion During the First World War. Social Science Monographs: War and 
Society in East Central Europe vol. XXXVI (Highland Lakes, NJ: Atlantic Research 
and Publications Inc., 1998). Hereafter: Glant, Prism. Only additional or specific 
information will be footnoted.
304
would guarantee world peace and international cooperation. A diplomatic 
solution seemed in order, as Wilson had to sell his project to friend and 
foe alike. Thus, from the beginning, negotiation was the Central element 
of his Habsburg diplomacy, too.
The starting point was the Allied note of January 10, 1917, which 
called fór the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. On February 8, 1917, 
following the diplomatic break with Germany Secretary of State Róbert 
Lansing sent detailed instructions to Ambassador Walter Hines Page in 
London, stating that Wilson was “trying to avoid breaking with Austria in 
order to keep the channels of official intercourse open” fór negotiation. 
“The chief if nőt the only obstacle is the threat apparently contained in the 
peace terms recently stated by the Entente Allies that in case they succeed 
they would insist upon a virtual dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire. Austria needs only to be reassured on that point, and that chiefly 
with regard to the older units of the Empire.”6 This note marks the 
beginning of a secret diplomatic offensive that used public diplomacy as 
bút one out of many means to achieve its goals. The Fourteen Points were 
undoubtedly the highlight of these public diplomatic efforts, bút they 
must be viewed in the broader context of Wilson’s (Habsburg) diplomacy.
Short of a better option, Wilson adopted the “divide and rule” 
policy of his Allies towards Berlin and Vienna. He launched this policy as 
a neutral, as we have seen, two months before the American declaration 
of war on Germany, and pursued this line until five months after he had 
asked fór, and secured, the declaration of war against Austria-Hungary. 
American negotiations with Vienna were terminated nőt by the 
declaration of war in December 1917, bút as result of the Sixtus affair of 
April 1918. It follows from the above that public diplomacy only served 
the goals of secret diplomacy: and, ironically, it was conducted by a 
president who called fór “open covenants of peace openly arrived at” in 
the Fourteen Points speech. Wilson clearly proved himself more than the 
missionary diplomát histórián Arthur S. Link saw in him:7 fór the sake of 
the new world that the League of Nations would bring about, he was quite 
willing to pursue secret diplomacy as well.
6 Arthur S. Link, ed., The Papers ofWoodrow Wilson. 66 vols. (Princeton: PrincetonUP, 
1966-98), Vol 41: 158-59. Hereafter cites as WWPs and by volume and page number.7
Arthur S. Link, Wilson, the Diplomatist: A Look at His Major Foreign Policies 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1957).
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Between February 1917 and May 1918 the American policy 
towards Austria-Hungary was basically the same: Washington tried to 
negotiate Vienna out of the war. In this game, public diplomacy was used 
to raise the stakes fór Vienna. In February 1917 the US indicated to the 
Ballhausplatz that she did nőt support the break-up of the Monarchy. In 
April no declaration of war was sought against Vienna, Germany’s most 
important ally. However, Vienna terminated diplomatic relations with 
Washington in response to the American declaration of war on Germany. 
Since no progress was made until December, Wilson asked fór a 
declaration of war on Austria-Hungary, too. Meanwhile, the Inquiry 
began preparations fór a “scientific peace,” and in its first report it 
suggested that Vienna’s willingness to negotiate could and should be 
intensified by publicly supporting separatist aspirations inside the 
Habsburg Empire while rejecting the obvious outcome: dismemberment. 
It was at this juncture that the President decided to address Congress and 
outline American war aims in a public address, as he saw them in early 
January 1918.8
The Fourteen Points reflected many of Wilson’s concerns about 
both the war and the future of mankind. Five of the fourteen points dealt 
with the future of the world: open diplomacy, freedom of the seas and 
trade, the reduction of armaments to the level of national defense (#1-4), 
and the creation of the League of Nations (#12). Nine of the fourteen 
points addressed actual territorial issues. The fifth point called fór a 
reasonable settlement of colonial claims, the seventh demanded the 
restoration of Belgian territories and independence, while the eighth 
postulated that French territories should be evacuated and Alsace- 
Lorraine be returned to Francé. The remaining six of the fourteen points 
addressed problems of Eastern, Central and Southern Europe. Wilson 
demanded the evacuation of territories occupied by the Central Powers in 
Russia, Italy and the Balkans (#5, 9, and 11), and proposed the liberation 
of all ethnic groups under Ottoman rule (#12) as well as the restoration of 
Polish independence (#13). The one point that was worded in a way that it 
remained open to different interpretations was Point Ten: “The peoples of 
Austria-Hungary, whose piacé among the nations we wish to see 
safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to 
autonomous development.”
Glant, Prism, see esp. Chapter 11 on Wilsonian diplomacy.
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Point Ten could be, and was, interpreted in two different ways. 
When he asked fór clarification on Point Ten, Secretary of the Navy 
Josephus Daniels was informed by his own Chief Executive that the 
United States “could nőt undertake to dictate the form of government of 
any country or dismember” it.9 At the same time, to an inquiry from 
French Ambassador Jules Jusserand whether Point Ten represented 
dismemberment, Wilson replied that it did.10 At that point, it did nőt; nőt 
yet. In a speech delivered on February 11, Wilson added “Four 
Principles” to the already listed fourteen: the postwar settlement must be a 
just one (based on national self-determination), people and territories 
must nőt be bartered with, and any settlement that would create future 
conflicts was unacceptable.
Meanwhile, secret negotiations in Switzerland continued between 
Austrian politician Heinrich Lammasch and Wilson supporter in exile 
George D. Herron until May 1918, when the publicity surrounding the 
Sixtus affair, arguably the most crucial diplomatic scandal of the war, 
rendered all such talks redundant. The story goes back to 1917, when the 
two Sixtus brothers of Bourbon-Parma offered to mediate (in this case, 
deliver letters) between Vienna and Paris. In a letter addressed to the 
French President, Austrian Emperor Charles I offered, among other 
things, Alsace-Lorraine in return fór a separate peace and territorial 
integrity fór Austria-Hungary. While this offer seemed acceptable to 
Paris in 1917, it certainly did nőt after the Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. 
Clemenceau now sought confrontation with Austrian Foreign Minister 
Count Ottokár Czernin through the Swiss press that printed both Allied 
and Central Powers news in French, Germán, and Italian alike. On April 
2, 1918 Czernin spoke in the Austrian parliament and described French 
insistence on Alsace-Lorraine as the only obstacle to peace. He was 
referring to the recent failure of the secret Armand-Revertera negotiations 
without actually naming them. When the details of his speech reached 
Paris via the Swiss press, Clemenceau accused Czernin of lying and 
published Emperor Charles’s letter. Czernin asked the Emperor fór 
clarification as he was clearly unaware of the Sixtus-letter. He later would 
resign and Berlin would force Vienna to agree to the establishment of 
joint military command under Germán control (Spa, Belgium, May 2). 
This, in turn, ruled out a possible separate peace with Austria-Hungary,
9 WWPs 45: 537.
10 WWPs 45: 559.
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as the young Emperor had no control over his own army. When 
Clemenceau was probed in the French legislature about his conduct, he 
replied that it was a premeditated move to prevent a “half-peace” with 
Austria. He certainly achieved his goal.11
The cessation of secret peace talks created a new situation in 
Washington. Up to that point, as we have seen, Wilson had pursued a 
single-track policy of trying to negotiate Vienna out of the war. Dissident 
voices in his own administration, most notably that of Secretary of State 
Róbert Lansing, became louder and demanded more open support fór the 
would-be successor States, which, in tűm, would have amounted to open 
support fór dismemberment. In May, the President was nőt ready to take 
that step yet. It was a combination of military developments in Soviet- 
Russia and the gradual realization of the ramifications of the termination 
of the secret talks that convinced him.
Wilson found an unwelcome Challenger in Lenin fór being the 
prophet of the post-war world without wars. This realization is generally 
accepted by Wilson scholars as one of the chief reasons why he went 
public with the Fourteen Points and the Four Principles.12 13He obviously 
would have liked to see the Reds fail against the Whites in the Russian 
civil war that followed the proclamation of the Soviet Republic in St. 
Petersburg, bút he ruled out military intervention fór two reasons: (1) he 
did nőt want to go against his own policy of nőt interfering in the 
domestic affairs of other countries; and (2) he had no sizable army or 
navy available to dispatch to the Far East, since he was under strong 
Allied pressure to provide immediate military help on the western front. 
Short of other options, Wilson decided on a policy of supplying the White 
forces with contraband, bút, to do that, he needed at least two things: 
Vladivostok as a port of entry and the Trans-Siberian Railway as a means 
of transportation. The Czechoslovak Légion provided him with an excuse 
to occupy Vladivostok with a tokén force.
11 On the Herron-Lammasch talks see: Mitchell Pirié Briggs, George D. Herron and the 
European Settlement (Stanford and London: Stanford UP: 1932). On the Sixtus affair 
see: Glant, Prism, 261-62.
12 This idea was first proposed by new left historians N. Gordon Levin and Amo J.,
Mayer.
13 Fór details on Wilson and Soviet-Russia in generál and the Czechoslovak Légion in 
particular, see: Dávid S. Foglesong, America’s Secret War Against Bolshevism: U. S. 
Intervention int he Russian Civil War, 1917-1920 (Chapel Hill and London: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1995).
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The Légion was 50,000 strong. It was officially under French 
command and Paris agreed to ship it to the western front to help fight fór 
an independent Czechoslovakia if it could make it to a port to sail from. 
The Légion secured Lenin’s approval and set out fór Vladivostok. 
Because of a series of misunderstandings mostly due to lack of 
communication, the Légion decided to occupy the strategically important 
stops along the Trans-Siberian Railway, which was the only line of 
transportation available. The news of the Légion’s exploits in Russia 
reached Washington in laté May, and it opened up the doors of the White 
House to the first ever separatist politician from Austria to be received by 
Wilson, Tomas G. Masaryk, the future president of the would-be 
Czechoslovakia.
The “heroic struggle of the Czechoslovak Légion fór independence” 
captured the imagination of the American people, nőt least because 
Wilson’s own semi-official department of propaganda, the Committee on 
Public Information (CPI), secured the continuous flow of information an 
analysis in this particular matter. Helping the Czechs to fight fór their 
independence proved to be sufficient justification fór sending a tokén 
American occupying force to Vladivostok. Incidentally, it alsó prevented 
the Japanese from moving in and expanding their control over the Far 
East. Support fór the Légion meant support fór Czechoslovak 
independence. On September 3, Washington officially recognized the 
Czechoslovak National Council as a de facto belligerent government.14 
On September 27, Wilson described an additional “Five Particulars” of 
peace to supplement the Fourteen Points and the Four Principles. On 
September 30, Bulgária asked fór an armistice, and within six weeks 
Germany and all her allies surrendered. The war ended abruptly on 
November 11, 1918.
Armistice Talks and Peace Preparations
As has been mentioned, American preparations fór a “scientific 
peace” began in September 1917. While Wilson was gradually moving 
away from non-dismemberment, the Inquiry worked on possible means of 
régiónál integration in the Danube hasin. All possible “trialist” Solutions
Fór a comprehensive analysis of the Wilson-Masaryk meetings see: Victor S. 
Mamatey, The United States and East Central Europe, 1914-1918: A Study in 
Wilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda (Princeton, Princeton UP, 1957).
14
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were evaluated and a comprehensive card catalogue and map collection 
was assembled. When the war did end, the Inquiry was called upon to 
submit its final recommendations. Sometime in mid-October, a 100-page 
report including several maps was submitted, together with an 11-page 
synopsis. It proposed dismemberment, bút pointed out that this would be 
unjust fór Hungary. It described the “linguistic frontier... to be constant 
with the accepted principles of modem democracy,” bút concluded that 
“the line of division between language groups is, in many districts, 
entirely impracticable as a national frontier.” This amounted to an 
admission that the Inquiry could nőt meet the requirements set by the 
President in the Four Principles fór a just peace in Central Europe.15 
Meanwhile, Vienna asked fór peace on the basis of the Fourteen Points in 
October, bút Wilson made it clear that the Fourteen Points had been 
reconsidered.
In laté October, under the supervision of Colonel House, who 
represented the US in armistice negotiations, Walter Lippmann and Frank 
I. Cobb prepared an updated commentary on the Fourteen Points, which 
then was sent to Washington fór Wilson’s approval. Of Point Ten they 
wrote: “This proposition no longer holds.” This revised version of the 
Fourteen Points was the official American line that Colonel House 
followed in the armistice negotiations with Austria. Thus, Point Ten 
finally came to stand fór the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, 
although Lippmann and Cobb reiterated that Washington “supports a 
programme aiming at a Confederation of Southeastem Europe.”16 
Régiónál integration after dismemberment was a relatively new bút 
important development in Wilsonian diplomacy. To understand it, we 
must go back to the summer of 1918.
During the summer of 1918 Wilson gradually began to accept 
dismemberment as something inevitable. This was manifested in two 
projects embraced by the CPI: one in Europe, the other in the United 
States. The CPI’s foreign propaganda campaigns were orchestrated by the 
muckraking journalist Will Irwin. His right-hand mán fór propaganda in 
enemy countries was James Keeley of the Chicago Héráid, who
15 Glant, Prism, see esp. Chapter 9 on the Inquiry.
16 Fór details of Wilson’s laté 1918 diplomacy see Arthur Walworth, American ’s 
Moment: 1918. American Diplomacy at the End o f  World War 1 (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Co., 1972). The appendix carries all the major Wilson texts from the 
Fourteen Points to the Lippmann-Cobb commentary.
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commenced work only in July 1918. Under strong Allied pressure, the 
American delegates to the Inter-Allied Propaganda Conference in London 
(August 14-17) agreed upon a new program to liquidate Austria-Hungary 
and the K und K army by inciting nationalist unrest using an all-out 
leaflet campaign. Meanwhile, in the United States the CPI began to 
sponsor an organization called the Mid-European Union, whose aim was 
to forge somé level of cooperation among the would-be successor States. 
Thus, it was Wilson’s openly stated expectation that somé kind of 
régiónál integration take piacé in the Danube hasin, replacing the empire 
of the Habsburgs, bút the representatives of the future victors in the 
United States started fighting over the spoils even before victory had been 
secured.17
By the Armistice, Wilson’s Habsburg diplomacy had run intő the 
second dead-end Street. The first one was the single-track policy of trying 
to negotiate Vienna out of the war, cut short by the Sixtus affair. The 
second one was dismemberment combined with régiónál integration. His 
own scientific advisors in the Inquiry made it clear that this would nőt 
work, and the Mid-European Union collapsed before the armistice. The 
President decided to pút the issue on the back burner and began to focus 
on the League of Nations. He proposed an umbrella treaty with all the 
Central Powers that would create the League, and the League would draw 
the final boundaries in the contested areas, bút only after wartime hatreds 
had cooled off.
The Paris Peace Conference
Wilson’s call fór an umbrella treaty under the aegis of the League of 
Nations was the same defensive retreat that he displayed with the “Peace 
without Victory” speech after his last attempt to mediate in the war had 
failed. In addition, the lack of a consistent American policy in Paris 
forced him to make a series of compromises.18
17 On the CPI see Glant, Prism, Chapter 8. On the Mid-European Union and its failure 
see: Arthur J. May, “The Mid-European Union,” in Joseph P. O’Grady, ed., The 
Immigrants’ Influence on Wilson’s Peace Policies (Louisville: University of 
Kentucky Press, 1967), 250-71.
18 The following summary is based on Arthur Walworth, Wilson and His Peacemakers. 
American Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919 (New York and London: 
W. W. Norton & Co., 1986), unless otherwise stated.
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The first of these compromises was about the League of Nations. 
The Peace Conference created the Covenant of the League of Nations 
first, bút made separate peace treaties with each of the defeated Central 
Powers, or their successors (e.g. Austria and Hungary). Each of the 
Versailles treaties included the Covenant as Article I, bút they alsó 
included very specific boundaries that reflected the largely unchallenged 
desires of the victors. Following the signing of the Germán treaty, Wilson 
retumed to the States and submitted the treaty fór ratification to a Senate 
in which the Republicans had won a clear majority in the 1918 midterm 
elections. The Republican majority in the Senate, driven by genuine 
concerns about collective security (Article X) and by personal dislikes 
(Henry Cabot Lodge) of the president, rejected the treaty. Thus, Wilson 
did bring about the League, bút his own country refused to jóin it.19 This, 
in tűm, seriously hindered his negotiating position in Paris.
The second compromise was the direct result of the first one. The 
conference started work with the Covenant of the League, bút insisted on 
various punitive measures (economic, military, and territorial) against the 
vanquished. The US was nőt interested in European territorial disputes, 
and the American Commission to Negotiate Peace (hereafter: ACNP) 
served as a moderating force in the boundary decisions (e.g. preventing 
the proposed Czechoslovak-Yugoslav corridor in Western Hungary). 
However, the committee work was done by the very same Inquiry experts 
who had reported to the president that they had no “just and practicable” 
solution to territorial matters in the Danube Basin. With or without the 
League, this was nőt going to be an American peace.
In Paris, Wilson was gradually forced to surrender his monopoly 
over decision making, which was his third compromise. During the war, 
as chief representative of the United States in foreign affairs, he had a free 
hand, and he exercised it. The biggest input intő his decisions came from 
without his cabinet: from Colonel House, who accepted no official post 
during the war. The roots of the treaty fight go back to Wilson’s decisions 
about the composition of the peace delegation. Of the five American
19 The first and most detailed account of the Treaty Fight was written by Thomas A. 
Bailey. More recent contributions have come from Lloyd E. Ambrosius. Thomas A. 
Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace and Woodrow Wilson and the Great 
Betrayal (New York: MacMillan, 1944 and 1945); Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonian 
Statecraft. Theory and Practice o f  Liberal Internationalism during World War I  
(Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1991).
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Commissioners, only one was a Republican. More importantly, the 
President left both American Nobel Peace Prize winners (incidentally, 
both Republicans) at home. One understands his decision regarding the 
dying TR, bút his choice to ignore Elihu Root remains puzzling. Root was 
the President of the Carnegie Endowment fór International Peace, and 
Wilson had sent him on a mission to study conditions in Russia in the 
second half of 1917. Thus, the ACNP was dominated by Democrats, 
which indicates that Wilson tried to sustain his one-man control over 
decisions. Undefined roles, parallel sessions in Paris, the constantly 
changing military situation in Central Europe and clash of egos 
contributed to nearly chaotic conditions inside the ACNP. Wilson sensed 
this, and after signing the Germán peace treaty, he went home and never 
returned to Paris. The political, economic, territorial, and military 
decisions about Hungary and the successor States of Austria-Hungary 
were made after he had departed. At this point in time, Frank L. Polk was 
in charge of the ACNP. In the face of conflict and challenge, Wilson 
again retreated.
Peace in the lands between Germany and Soviet-Russia was made 
according to the designs of French security.20 The Treaty of Trianon 
dismembered the Kingdom of Hungary. Hungary lost two thirds of her 
territory and population: Rumania got a piece of the Kingdom of Hungary 
which was bigger than Trianon Hungary itself. 3.5 millión Hungarians 
found themselves living in the successor States, most of them just across 
the new borders. Clearly, President Wilson’s ideas (the Fourteen Points, 
the Four Principles and the Five Particulars) about a just and scientific 
peace did nőt apply to Hungary.
Hungarians, of course, refused to accept the proposed peace terms, 
or the fact that the successor States used military force to lay claim to 
more and more Hungárián territory. Revisionist propaganda to defend 
Hungárián territorial integrity and/or to reclaim lost territories started in 
laté 1918 and remained the most important political and diplomatic issue 
fór Budapest until the two Vienna Awards on the eve of World War II.
20 Mária Ormos, From Padua to the Trianon, 1918-1920 (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 
1981), Magda Ádám, The Little Entente and Europe (1920-1929) (Budapest: 
Akadémiai Kiadó, 1993), and Ignác Romsics, The Dismantling o f Historic Hungary: 
The Peace Treaty o f  Trianon, 1920 (Boulder: East European Monographs, 2002).
313
In an excellent and thought provoking expose, Wolfgang 
Schivelbusch reviewed the “culture of defeat” in the American South after 
the Civil war, Francé after 1871, and Germany after World War I. Next, 
I will explain how Schivelbusch’s theory fits Hungárián treaty 
revisionism and the myth of the Fourteen Points.
Schivelbusch identifies the various stages of coming to terms with 
defeat. Defeat in battle in most cases is followed by revolution. The new 
elites propelled to power by these revolutions blame the old elite fór the 
war and defeat and distance themselves frorn the pást (purification). They 
believe that the victors will respect the new political establishment (which 
is a denial of the old order they, the victors, had fought against), and 
defeat turns intő a euphoric dreamland. However, the vanquished are 
always blamed fór the war, and punitive peace terms are enforced by the 
victors: thus bringing about a rude awakening. The myth of double 
betrayal is born: (1) the victors betrayed us, by punishing us instead of 
the old order, from which we have purified ourselves, and (2) the leaders 
of the revolution alsó betrayed us, because their promises never 
materialized. The legitimacy of victory is questioned (“stáb in the back” 
theories), and the spirit of revenge and scapegoating takes over. Because 
of betrayal, the vanquished become the morál victors in the war; their 
culture is superior to that of the (“savage”) victor. Defeat results in morál 
purification, while victory carries the seeds of defeat in the next conflict. 
The vanquished reinterpret their own history and come to view the road to 
defeat a dead-end Street. Renewal is completed by the declaration of the 
morál superiority of the defeated over the victor.
Defeat was followed by revolutions in Hungary after the First 
World War. The October revolution of Count Michael Károlyi created its 
own dreamland and placed the concept of a just, Wilsonian peace (the 
Fourteen Points) at its center. From posters that read, “From Wilson only 
a Wilsonian Peace” to the major press organs of the Károlyi period, the 
média promoted the expectation that the American President was “our 21
Hungary, the Fourteen Points, and the “Culture of Defeat”
21 Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Culture o f  Defeat. On National Trauma, Mouming, and 
Recovery (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2003). This is the English translation by 
Jefferson Chase of the Germán original from 2001. Hereafter: Schivelbusch, Culture 
o f Defeat.
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only hope” and that he would never accept an unjust settlement. This 
was clearly an escape from reality: as has been pointed out, Wilson made 
it clear before the armistice talks that Point Ten of the Fourteen Points did 
nőt apply anymore. In this dreamland, Wilson brought the just peace 
while Hoover provided the necessary food and medical supplies to 
survive. An alternative dreamland was created by the Hungárián Soviet 
Republic by claiming that Hungary’s future lay in a post-imperialist, 
socialist world under Soviet guidance. Awakening came when the 
successor States, with strong backing from the French, attacked the 
Kingdom of Hungary after the armistice to secure territories and create a 
fait accompli fór the Peace Conference. The rudeness of this awakening 
was made abundantly clear by the Treaty of Trianon. Simultaneously, the 
myth of double betrayal was born.
The first one was supposedly committed by the Allies in generál 
and President Wilson in particular. According to it, we, Hungarians, got 
rid of the old order and rearranged our country along the democratic lines 
promoted by the American president, then placed our future in the hands 
of the victors and our “trust in the chivalry of the enemy.”2 34 They 
betrayed us by nőt giving us a fair, Wilsonian peace. The second myth of 
betrayal follows from the above, and was generated by the Horthy régimé 
in the early 1920s. That régimé defined itself as “counterrevolutionary” in 
denial of the 1918-19 revolutions and blamed Károlyi and Kun fór defeat 
and territorial losses. This, at least in part, was due to the fact that the 
Horthy éra witnessed the partial retum of the pre-war elite of the 
Kingdom of Hungary.
Schivelbusch writes, “It is a short step from the idea that victory 
achieved by unsoldierly means is illegitimate (or deceitful, swindled, 
stolen, and so on) and therefore invalid to an understanding of defeat as 
the pure, unsullied antithesis of false triumph.”25 What seemed legitimate 
and logical from the point of view of the Allies and the successor States
22
22 Fór details see Chapter 5 in Tibor Hajdú, Károlyi Mihály. Politikai életrajz (Budapest:
Kossuth, 1978). This is the best Károlyi biography to the present day.
23 Fór details see the works of Ormos, Adám, and Romsics cited in note 20 above. A 
different perspective is provided in Peter Pastor, Hungary between Wilson and Lenin: 
The Hungárián Revolution o f  118-1919 and the Big Three (Boulder: East European
Quarterly, 1976).
24 Schivelbusch, Culture o f  Defeat, 14.
25 Schivelbusch, Culture o f  Defeat, 17.
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was illegitimate, unjust and unjustifiable fór Hungarians. The continuous 
modification of armistice lines to the detriment of Hungary in 1918-19 as 
well as the thinly veiled French support fór military action against 
Hungary after Hungary had surrendered all pointed to an unjust peace. 
Betrayal continued to mix with dreamland when the Hungarians argued 
that Americans are alsó morally responsible fór the treaty and they should 
act as impartial judges as they are nőt interested in territorial gains in 
Europe. This delusional expectation was further intensified by the fact 
that the 1921 separate US-Hungarian peace treaty did nőt include the 
Trianon borders.
Revenge and scapegoating appeared on two different levels in post- 
World War I Hungary. On the one hand, the two revolutions created their 
own narratives and claimed their own victims. During the Károlyi 
revolution the strong mán of Hungary, former Premier István Tisza, was 
brutally murdered by “revolutionaries” in front of his own family. Like 
the Károlyi régimé, the Bolsheviks alsó blamed the old order fór 
everything and installed a reign of terror unforeseen in Hungary. The 
murder of Tisza and the Red Terror created a backlash and a spirit of 
revenge, and while many of the Bolshevik murderers were investigated by 
the police and sentenced by the courts, somé historians question the 
legitimacy of these trials and point to White Terrorist massacres west of 
the Danube in the fali of 1919.26 In interwar Hungary “Bolshevik Jews” 
were responsible fór territorial losses, in post-World War II communist 
Hungary “White Fascists” were the root of all évii. This is what happens 
when historical narratives are monopolized by political ideologies.
Revenge and scapegoating alsó manifested themselves in the 
territorial revisionist policies of Trianon Hungary. The “ungentlemanly” 
Czechs, Rumanians and Yugoslavs as well as French diplomats (all 
unworthy victors) were held responsible fór the unjust treaty,27 and 
Hungarians applauded the two Vienna Awards, granted by Nazi Germany 
on the eve of the war, that returned somé of the lost territories.
Somé of the police records survived systematic Communist destruction after World 
War II as they were printed in Magyar Detektív, a forgottén police monthly between 
the wars. Fór the White Terror see Eliza Johnson Ablovatski, ‘“ Cleansing the Red 
Nest’: Counterrevolution and White Terror in Munich and Budapest, 1919” (Ph.D.
diss., Columbia University, 2004).
27 One such author was Henri Pozzi, whose A háború visszatér (The war retums) saw 
ten editions (!) by 1935 with dr. Marjay Frigyes kiadó, a fascist publisher.
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Belief in the inevitability and legitimacy of territorial revision thus 
went hand in hand with the myth of double betrayal, scapegoating, and 
the spirit of revenge. Miklós Zeidler’s excellent book on Hungárián 
revisionism is available in English fór additional detail, so I would like 
to focus on a more specific example: Hungárián filmic propaganda 
against the Soviet Union during World War II. Postwar communist 
authorities tried to destroy all copies of these films. The lőne survivor 
appears to be Zoltán Farkas’s Negyedízigen (To the fourth generation, 
1942). This is a pro-Christian, anticommunist propaganda movie that 
carries no anti-Semitic references. At the siege of a small Russian town, 
civilians flee, bút an old mán surrenders to the Hungárián troops. He is 
István Keresztes, a former Bolshevik leader in the Tiszakövesd Soviet in 
1919, who had lived in the Soviet Union since 1920. He is disillusioned, 
and would like to return to Hungary to his family, among them his són, 
Gábor. In the battle of Krivoi Rog, Vera, Keresztes’s Soviet-bom 
daughter, kills a Hungárián soldier, who later turns out to be her own 
brother. She then returns to Hungary with her father, where she faces a 
non-Soviet way of life based on individual achievement and family 
values, and leams the truth about her brother’s death from a returning 
Hungárián soldier. As the front draws near to Hungary, Vera starts to 
work fór Soviet intelligence. Her conscience and guilt force her to recon 
with herself. She turns against the Soviets, and gets killed in a shootout 
with Soviet paratroopers. The title of the movie refers to the Second 
Commandment: “I do nőt leave unpunished the sins of those who haté 
me, bút I punish the children fór the sins of their parents to the third and 
fourth generations.” The movie ends with Keresztes entering a church and 
reading the very next sentence from the Bibié: “Bút I lavish my lőve on 
those who lőve me and obey my commands, even fór a thousand
. „29generations.
The Farkas movie takes us to the final two stages of coming to 
terms with defeat: claiming morál victory and renewal. In the film, the 
dead-end Street of the pást is the Hungárián Soviet Republic, and the 
superiority of Christian faith is established over atheistic communism. 
Hungárián superiority is represented by the civilized Hungárián troops 28
28 Miklós Zeidler, Ideas on Territorial Revision in Hungary, 1920-1945 (Wayne, N.J.:
Center fór Hungárián Studies and Publications, 2007).
Exodus 20: 5-6. New Living Bibié. The symbolism in the film is thinly veiled. 
Keresztes in Hungárián means someone bearing a cross, or crusader.
29
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liberating the Soviet Union. Soviet inferiority is embodied in Vera: lack 
of family values, women turnéd intő killing machines, totál loss of 
individuality; all leading to personal tragedy “to the fourth generation.”
As has been pointed out, the Fourteen Points had nothing to do with 
the reconquest of the territories lost in Trianon. The Nazi Germán alliance 
and occupation (in 1944) meant that Hungary ended up on the receiving 
end of still another defeat. A second, even more punitive Treaty of 
Trianon (1947) was enforced. Bút, fór half a century, Hungary was part of 
the Soviet bloc together with the successor States; thus any revisionist 
reconsideration of the treaty was beyond question. Post-World War II 
democratic Hungary had bút two years, and in that period only the first 
two steps of coming to terms with defeat were taken: dreamland and 
awakening. The 1947 communist takeover brought about a new historical 
narrative: that of the “guilty nation” which served as “Hitler’s last 
satellite,” and therefore deserved the punishment of the second Trianon 
Treaty. With a few notable exceptions, communist Hungárián history 
writing focused nőt on historical fact bút on ideological expectation. This 
worked against the common sense and experience of the people who 
witnessed these events, and in 1989 the lid came off.
The lack of proper academic discourse of the pást has recently 
brought about a revival of pre-World War II revisionist literature. On one 
level, this is a heritage of the communist éra. At the end of the war, the 
Soviet-sponsored, temporary govemment of Hungary (1944-45) began to
O A
issue lists of “Fascist, anti-Soviet, antidemocratic print média.” These 
were to be submitted to the authorities fór destruction, and nőt complying 
with the regulation had serious legal and personal consequences. The 
attempt to destroy all printed proof of a way of life combined with the 
brutal destruction of the social order of prewar Hungary by Stalinist 
methods resulted in quiet bút stubborn resistance, and people hung on to 
these books. Since 1989 these publications have sold at exorbitant prices 
at auctions, while a poor man’s version of many of these texts is being
• .  O 1 # # #
made available on the internet. Somé of these publications contain 
unacceptable ideas and poorly argued “histories.” Others are simply pulp *
30
31
A fasiszta, szovjetellenes, antidemokratikus sajtótermékek jegyzéke. 3 vols. (Budapest:
A Magyar Miniszterelnökség Sajtóosztálya, 1945). These publications were removed
even from library catalogs and national bibliographies. 
www.axioart.hu is the auction website, and it can be accessed in English, too; 
www.betiltva.com is one of many websites fór such texts.
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fiction crime stories depicting Soviet agents in the West in an unfavorable 
light.
The Fourteen Points in Hungárián History Writing
By way of conclusion let us review the postwar history of the 
Fourteen Points. The analysis provided in the first half of this essay on the 
war was made possible by the opening of French (1972) and Russian 
(1991) archives, by the availability of American and Hungárián primary 
resources, and by the output of new left history writing. This, however, 
does nőt mean that there was no means of reviewing the myths 
surrounding the Fourteen Points, even before World War II.
Wilson’s statements about the coming peace in 1918 received 
global exposure from the CPI, which circulated 10,000 copies of nine 
different pamphlets of Wilson speeches in Germán. Yet, this pamphlet 
campaign was launched rather laté, and the Fourteen Points and the 
Lippmann-Cobb interpretation reached Hungary at about the same time, 
just as the war was nearing its end. Hungárián leaders chose to hear the 
things they wanted to hear and ignore the information they did nőt want to 
face: this is how the dreamland of the Károlyi éra was born.32 3
In the interwar period much of the primary Wilson matériái was 
already available. Thus, fór historians of the interwar period the problem 
was nőt the shortage of resources. To use, and amend, Schivelbusch’s 
terminology: in interwar Hungary the various stages of coming to terms 
with defeat existed simultaneously and did nőt follow one another in strict 
chronological order. This can be demonstrated by both official Horthy éra 
history writing and the narratives turnéd out by various extreme right 
wing movements.
Professor Jenő Horváth was the “official” histórián of Trianon 
between the wars. He contributed the chapter on the diplomatic
32 Fór a fresh and provocative account on the CPI see Gregg Wolper, “The Origins of 
Public Diplomacy: Woodrow Wilson, George Creel, and the Committee on Public 
Information” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1991) and my “Against All Odds: 
Vira B. Whitehouse and Rosika Schwimmer in Switzerland, 1918,” American Studies
International 2002/2: 34-51.
33 In her dissertation to be defended in 2010, Éva Mathey of the University of Debrecen 
offers a detailed analysis of Horváth’s works. The dissertation deals with the United 
States and Hungárián revisionism between the world wars.
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background of the treaty to the Justice fór Hungary volume,34 and penned 
the most detailed account of what he called the “Hungárián question in 
the 20th century.” In the first of two volumes of this seminal work, he 
prints the documents of the armistice negotiations between Washington 
and Vienna, bút comes to a surprising conclusion: “President Wilson was 
unaware of the fact that he lent his support nőt to freedom bút to 
annexation and that he was set against Emperor Charles in the interest of 
Czech émigrés.”35 This is the Masaryk myth, according to which the 
Czech professor convinced the American professor-president behind 
closed doors to support the reorganization of Central Europe. Horváth, to 
use Schivelbusch’s theory, is in the third stage of coming to terms with 
defeat: questioning the legitimacy of victory at the expense of balanced 
historical analysis.
Since territorial revision was achieved with the help of Nazi 
Germany, the American line is largely missing from the historical 
narratives of the extreme right. One representative histórián of the various 
fascist movements was Lajos Marschalkó, who blamed Bolshevik Jews 
and Károlyi fór defeat and territorial losses. In Kik árulták el 1918-ban 
Magyarországot (Who betrayed Hungary in 1918) he passes 
condescending remarks about Károlyi’s childlike faith in the Fourteen 
Points and correctly interprets American diplomatic correspondence that 
said Point Ten would nőt be the basis fór armistice negotiations.36 378In 
postwar emigration, he stepped up the rhetoric and described the 
Hungárián Soviet Republic as “a country of hunchbacks” bút failed to 
mention Wilson or the Fourteen Points. Written in a somewhat different 
tone, an other key text, A magyar nemzet őszinte története (An honest 
history of the Hungárián nation) by Ödön Málnási, does nőt even mention 
the Fourteen Points. Thus, in the historical paradigm of the extreme
34 Eugene Horváth, “Diplomatic History of the Treaty of Trianon,” in Justice fór Hungary. 
Review and Criticism o f  the Effect o f  the Treaty o f  Trianon (London: Longmans,
Green, and Co., 1928), 21-121.The book was alsó printed in Hungárián.
35 Jenő Horváth, Felelősség a világháborúért és a békeszerződésért (Responsibility fór 
the war and the peace) (Budapest: MTA, 1939), 448-53; the quote is from p. 449.
36 Lajos Marschalkó, Kik árulták el 1918-ban Magyarországot (Budapest: Stádium,
1944).
37 Lajos Marschalkó, Országhódítók (Conquerors of the country) (Munich, 1965), Part
2: Chapter 5.
38 ••Ödön Málnási, A magyar nemzet őszinte története (Budapest: Cserépfalvi, 1937), 
Chapter 15.
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right, the scapegoat was nőt the misled American president bút the 
physically and mentally distorted “Bolshevik Jews” who ran the 
Hungárián Soviet Republic.
Postwar Hungárián history writing represented the other extreme. 
Alsó using highly emotional language, it turnéd out dozens of books to 
demonstrate how western imperialists misrepresented the Soviet system 
and how they tried to destroy it hand in hand with the prewar elite of 
Hungary. Hungary’s attempt to normalize her relations with the western 
powers during the 1960s brought about a marked change in the tone and 
quality of Trianon history writing. Authors like Zsuzsa L. Nagy, Mária 
Ormos, Tibor Hajdú, Magda Adám, and Lajos Arday produced 
surprisingly balanced accounts, given the circumstances in Hungary. Yet, 
these works did nőt offer new analyses of the Fourteen Points. The 
relevant chapter of the 10-part, 20-volume history of Hungary pút out by 
the Academy did. The authors interpreted Wilson’s speech as an attempt 
to “dissuade the Soviet government from making a separate peace and 
promised help in its fight” against the Germans. Bút, the authors go on, he 
alsó tried to “monopolize the Soviet program fór peace and partly tailor it 
to the designs of American imperialism.”39 40 Like in the case of Horváth, 
ideological concems overrode historical analysis.
Communist Hungary had an interesting problem with American 
history in generál and the Fourteen Points in particular. American history 
and American studies were relegated to the realm of “if you don’t talk 
about it, it doesn’t exist.” In the cultural policy of “the three T-s,” it feli 
considerably closer to “Tilt” (forbid) than “Tűr” (tolerate), while 
“Támogat” (support) was never an option. On the other hand, the 
establishment viewed itself as the heir apparent of “the Glorious 
Hungárián Soviet Republic” and treated the time between 1919 and 1947 
as an unnecessary, fascist dead-end Street. It described Hungary’s road 
from defeat to communism as a natural process in 1918-19, bút in this 
discourse the Fourteen Points could nőt be ignored. This dichotomy can
39 Fór details see notes 20 and 22 above; Zsuzsa L. Nagy, A párizsi békekonferencia és 
Magyarország, 1919 (The Paris Peace Conference and Hungary, 1919) (Budapest: 
Kossuth, 1965), Lajos Arday, Térkép, csata után. Magyarország a brit külpolitikában, 
1918-1919 (Map after battle. Hungary in British foreign policy, 1918-1919)
(Budapest: Magvető, 1990).
40 Péter Hanák, et al., eds., Magyarország története 1890-1918. 2 vols. (Budapest: 
Akadémiai Kiadó, 1978): 2: 1181.
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be observed in education policy, too. With two to three history classes a 
week, secondary school history textbooks of my generation covered four 
American topics in four years: the American Revolution, the Civil War, 
the Fourteen Points, and Roosevelt’s New Deal.
It follows from the above that the three major schools of Trianon 
history writing of the first 70 years in Hungary evaluated the Fourteen 
Points on the basis of preconceptions and nőt facts. All in all, before 1989 
there was always somé consideration that overruled historical common 
sense in teliing the story of the Fourteen Points. The task was left fór our 
generation, and with this essay I intended to start academic discussion.
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